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Abstract
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During the late 1980s and the 1990s, most countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa implemented agricultural policy 
reforms, along with national political and economic 
reforms. The agricultural reforms focused on opening 
up processing and marketing activities to increased 
competition and eliminating export taxes and restrictions 
to improve producer incentives. In eight of nine country/
commodity case studies analyzed in this paper, output 
responded positively in the short run to the reforms. In 
many cases, however, the initial supply response was not 
sustained in the face of subsequent shocks. The studies 
suggest that stakeholder consensus on the distribution 
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of sector-specific rents is a key variable affecting the 
sustainability of supply responses. Agricultural sector 
reforms lead to large changes in income distribution. 
The greater the acceptance of the distribution of rents 
following the reforms, the better sectors are able to 
accommodate subsequent shocks. In cases where the 
initial consensus on the distribution of rents is weak, 
shocks lead to reform reversals in some cases or an 
inability to design necessary support institutions in 
others. The diversity in outcomes across similar products 
and countries suggests it is possible to achieve sector and 
local level results that differ from national ones. Consensus, Institutions, and Supply Response: 
The Political Economy of Agricultural Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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In the late 1980s and during much of the 1990s, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
initiated agricultural policy reforms either as part of wider structural adjustment programs or as 
self-standing reform programs. Agricultural growth rates recorded after the reforms have been 
uneven and in many countries the sustained agricultural growth observed in Asia and Latin 
America was not replicated (Akiyama et al 2001 and 2003). Kherallah et al (2002, p. 157) 
conclude that: “Despite positive changes in some sectors and some countries, the overwhelming 
current consensus is that the overall limited supply price response in Sub-Saharan Africa is due to 
structural and institutional constraints that have been ignored by market reforms.” Baffes and 
Garner (2003) have shown that outcomes are highly diverse and that it is not straightforward to 
determine the reasons for success and failure.  
This paper summarizes the findings of nine country case studies of commodity market reforms in 
SSA. These expand on previous work by placing the reforms in the context of the political 
economy of redistribution generated by the policy changes, and focusing on the ability of the new 
institutional structures created through the reforms to accommodate shocks (North et al 2009). 
We adapt the analytical framework developed by Rodrik (1999) to analyze GDP growth patterns, 
which suggests that the ability to respond to negative external shocks is related to the degree of 
social conflict and prevalent institutions of conflict management. The agricultural policy reforms 
implemented in the late 1980s and 1990s in SSA involved the reduction or elimination of 
regulatory and fiscal constraints on the private sector, redistributing income from the previous 
groups of intermediaries to the producers, many of whom were smallholders. In order for this 
redistribution to be sustained and successful there had to be some agreement among the 
stakeholders on the desirability and acceptability of the new set of arrangements, and the resulting 
income distribution. 
During the initial stage that followed a policy reform such as marketing liberalization, there was 
often a surge in private sector activity resulting from increased producer prices as competition 
among traders increased or because export taxes were reduced. Producers responded to these 
higher prices and re-committed to the crop or activity. During this stage, production often 
increased and the reform appeared to be successful. These initial positive responses were reversed 
in many cases when unforeseen developments or shocks took place such as a price collapse, crop 
diseases, and/or private sector became unsuccessful in its efforts. Such initial positive responses 
and the subsequent reversals suggest the distinction between growth accelerations and sustained 
growth episodes also can apply at the sectoral level.
1  
                                                 
1 The timing of the reforms - mostly in the early 1990s- coincided with increases in international commodity prices. 
The period 1990-1997 was characterized by increasing international commodity prices. These prices began to decline 
in 1997 in tandem with the Asian financial crisis. The period of declining and low prices continued until 2002 after 
which there was another price increase in a price spike in 2008. The price declines that occurred after 1997 were 
passed on to the producers but, in most of the cases in our sample, the post-2000 price increases were not passed on 3 
 
Our main hypothesis is that the capacity to respond to external and internal shocks depends on the 
degree of political and social consensus on the reforms. In cases where the first-stage positive 
supply response could not be sustained, the degree of political and social consensus on the 
reforms was also found to be weak from the beginning. Moreover, adequate mechanisms to 
redistribute income following a negative shock were not built into the new institutional 
arrangements. In cases where there was sustained growth despite the shocks, there was greater 
agreement on the reforms. This allowed the stakeholders to experiment with alternative 
arrangements to cope with incoming shocks.  
In the next sections a conceptual framework is developed and applied to nine export commodities 
in selected countries in SSA. To limit the coverage and for ease of analysis, this study focuses 
only on export crops, but the framework is equally applicable to other crops and sectors. The 
cases are cashew in Mozambique; coffee and tea in Kenya; cashew, coffee, tea, and tobacco in 
Tanzania; coffee in Uganda, and cotton in Zambia. This sample is not a representative one for 
SSA, but it is sufficiently diverse to illustrate the main hypotheses of the paper, and was selected 
on the basis of previous work done by the authors.
2  
1.  Growth Accelerations and Growth Sustainability  
As mentioned, Rodrik (1999 and 2007) differentiates between growth accelerations, which are 
more common and sustained growth over longer periods of time, which are rare. Growth 
accelerations usually require elimination of only a few key constraints that hold back the 
economic activity while sustained growth requires capacity and institutions to continuously 
monitor and eliminate emerging constraints. Sustained growth requires an ability to adjust to 
negative shocks.
3 Negative shocks or developments will have a greater impact the greater are 
social or political conflicts and the less developed are institutions for managing these conflicts.
4 
This is more likely when there is no consensus on how to redistribute the income losses resulting 
from shocks among different groups. This framework suggests a distinction between “growth 
accelerations” and sustained longer-term growth. Growth accelerations usually require 
elimination of only a few key constraints that hold back the economic activity. Longer-term 
sustained growth requires the development and existence of institutions that can accommodate 
shocks and allow systems to rebound from negative developments.
5  
                                                                                                                                                              
to the producers because of appreciating local currencies. Output collapses took place when the international prices 
for such commodities started declining. For details, see Onal and Aksoy (2011). 
2 Individual case studies and other related papers are in “ Prices, Institutions, and Supply Response: Case Studies in 
African Agriculture, (2011), Forthcoming,   
3 North et al (2009) also place the ability to adjust to shocks as a key variable creating higher growth in open access 
societies compared to limited access ones.  
4 The term “shock” is used throughout the study as an unforeseen development that upsets the status quo and requires 
collective action for its solution.   
5 Rodrik (2007) observes almost 80 cases of GDP growth accelerations, but few cases of sustained growth, i.e., 
growth that transforms the countries. 4 
 
Rodrik (1999) expresses this relationship with the following functional form. Changes in growth 
rates depend on the magnitude and direction of external shocks, the existing degree of social 
conflict, and the strength of institutions of conflict management. A higher degree of social 
conflict would amplify the negative effects of an external shock while better institutions of 
conflict management would dampen its effects. Outcomes depend on the interactions of these 
three variables.   
 
                           
                        
                                   
 
 
This general framework can also be applied to analyses of commodity policy reforms by treating 
reforms as a “shock.”
6 Their initial effect is to change the distribution of incomes along the 
production and distribution chain, and therefore they are necessarily a potential source of 
conflict.
7 In the case of commodity market reforms the policy changes increase incomes of 
producers and new private sector participants and reduce incomes of intermediaries or other 
groups that were extracting rents from the sector.  Thus they create both losers and gainers.
8 If the 
losing groups were small and the losses could be made up quickly, the degree of conflict would 
be lower than in the reverse case and the ability to create a consensus would thus be greater.  
Social conflict and the inability to accommodate negative shocks would be greater when the 
agricultural policy reforms initially faced a significant disagreement. In such cases, the shocks 
that jeopardized the gains from reforms adopted would increase the opposition from groups that 
objected to the policy changes in the first place. There would be attempts to return to ex-ante 
environments, probably with little success. But this controversy would create uncertainties for the 
producers, and reduce the probability of having a successful adjustment or improvements in the 
original reform program. In cases where there were some agreement on the need and desirability 
of policy changes, adjustment to a negative shock would be easier. The degree of conflict and the 
new arrangements for conflict management would determine not only the success of the reforms 
in the immediate future, but also the outcomes of future shocks. 
                                                 
6The distinction between an internal and external shock is not very clear, especially in a commodity based analysis. 
For example, a change in the international price of a commodity is clearly an external shock but changes in real 
exchange rates which have the same effect as the change in international prices would be internal. In this paper the 
term “shock” will be used to denote a change that upsets the existing arrangements whether it originates internally or 
externally. 
7 This is pointed out by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p.20) “Most policy choices create distributional conflict; one 
policy benefits one group while another benefits different individuals.”  
8 In the design of the reforms, their redistributive effects are not explicitly discussed. The implicit assumption is that 
the gains from greater output would allow everyone to gain from the reforms. However, the productivity and output 
gains are usually attained over a longer time period while the income losses are immediate. Furthermore, most 
countries lack the redistributive instruments to reallocate the incomes.  5 
 
Table 1 shows the production levels prior and following the reforms for the sample cases.
9 Since 
each case has a separate reform date, five years prior to the reforms - including the reform year - 
and five years following the initiation of the reforms are used as pre- and post-reform periods. In 
seven out of the nine cases, output increased substantially following the reforms. The exceptions 
are coffee in Kenya and Tanzania. These results partially support the fact that there is significant 
short run supply response capability in SSA, and that the reforms, by changing the incentives for 
the producers, led to these output increases.    
Table 1: Production Before and After the Reforms 
Commodity  Country 











Coffee  Kenya  1988-92  1993-97  87  82  47 
Coffee  Uganda  1988-92  1993-97  121  172  167 
Cashew  Mozambique  1990-94  1995-99  23  39  41 
Cashew  Tanzania  1988-92  1993-97  26  59  90
10 
Coffee  Tanzania  1990-94  1995-99  47  46  53 
Tea  Kenya  1988-92  1993-97  187  229  336 
Tea  Tanzania  1989-93  1994-98  90  105  141 
Cotton  Zambia  1990-94  1995-99  47  79  152 
Tobacco  Tanzania  1991-95  1996-00  22  35  52 
 
The key constraint on the commodity sector performance was insufficient producer incentives. 
By eliminating most of the intermediate agencies and reducing and eliminating export taxes and 
restrictions, the agricultural policy reforms led to higher prices for the farmers. They fit into the 
categorization of the growth accelerations through the elimination of major constraints, and as 
expected they lead to spurts in output growth.  
We also include the production levels for the last five years in Table 1 as a proxy for the longer-
term sustainable growth outcomes. They are indicative of whether the initial supply responses 
were maintained and improved upon. Of course, given the cyclical behavior of production in 
many cases, output in the last five years might not give a clear sense of the sustainability of the 
growth process. 
11 It is just another indicator in addition to our judgments on status of the sector 
around 2008.  The case studies and the discussions below indicate that four cases of can be 
thought of as showing sustained growth. These are Zambia cotton, Kenya and Tanzania tea, and 
                                                 
9 The details of the output movements along with the behavior of producer prices are analyzed in the following 
sections. For the further details, the reader is referred to the original papers.  
10 Cashew production in Tanzania is higher in the last five years but it is much lower than the peak production 
attained in the post-reform period (see Fig. 9).   
11 Commodity prices have been increasing for the last few years which might skew the results of the last five years.   6 
 
Tanzania tobacco. In Kenya coffee, we do not observe increases either after the reforms or in the 
longer run. The other four cases can be treated as having non-sustained supply responses.  
2.  Reforms, Stakeholders and Redistribution 
In many countries, the agricultural policy reforms coincided with political reforms. In Zambia, 
Kenya, and Tanzania, long time single-party systems were being abandoned and multi-party 
systems were being established. In Uganda and Mozambique, civil war had ended and attempts 
were being made to bring in multi-party systems although one dominant party maintained the 
control. While many of the old leaders stayed in power, the political processes became more 
competitive, new actors and groups obtained some voice and had to be accommodated in the 
distribution of the rents.   
Along with political liberalization, the primacy of state in economic affairs was also being 
revisited. Many of the SSA countries had disastrous economic outcomes as a consequence of 
nationalization of production, processing, and marketing of export crops. In almost all countries 
there were attempts to privatize the economic activities, especially the parastatals involved in 
agricultural marketing and production. Agricultural reforms were undertaken under these set of 
circumstances.  
Agricultural policy reforms ended up redistributing income from politically connected 
intermediary groups to mostly smallholder producers that had little connection to the political 
elites. This pitted the groups that were benefitting from the ancient regime against the groups that 
were to benefit from the liberalization. There were losses by the political groups that were 
associated with the management of the parastatals, groups that were in key positions in public 
service, and private groups that had been given monopolistic powers by the political system.
12 
Many of the old and some of the new intermediaries and processors were linked to the political 
elite and parties. In some cases the revenue bases of local governments depended on taxation of 
export crops and they would have lost their revenue bases with reforms. Then there were groups 
like the agricultural producers and private marketers and processers that were to be the 
beneficiaries of the reforms.  
Policies were also influenced by two groups that entered into the economic sphere at the time of 
the reforms. The first of these new groups were the multinational companies that entered the 
sectors and started to work with the smallholders.
13  Historically they had played a role through 
                                                 
12 There are debates on whether one can define the managers and workers in the cooperative and parastatal sector as 
an interest group. In many countries they are among the local supporters (cadres) of the party in power or are 
associated with the tribe that was in power. Thus, the group in power needed to support them in one form or another 
to maintain its power base.   
13 In most countries these multinationals existed in one form or the other. But privatizations and liberalizations gave 
them the opportunity to establish themselves as the key actors in cotton production in Zambia and tobacco production 
in Tanzania. They were already established in the tea sectors in Kenya and Tanzania.   7 
 
the large estates that they managed. Now they started working directly with the smallholders and 
were supplying the services that were provided by the parastatals before the reforms.  
Second group that also had an important role in the policy discussions were the donor 
community. Most of the reforms in SSA were undertaken under pressure from the international 
financial institutions and other donors. This was especially important during the early 1990s 
when most of the SSA countries were effectively bankrupt, and the donor groups gained greater 
influence using their aid that shifted from project support to “structural adjustment” requiring 
policy reforms by the governments. Later they insisted on similar policy changes in return for 
debt write off.  
One import indicator of changes in the income distribution is the share of the export price 
received by the producers. Historically this share has been very low which discouraged 
production and was seen as an important constraint to greater supply response. So a key objective 
of the reforms was to increase this share. This measure of redistribution was used as an indicator 
of success in the evaluations of African reforms (Townsend 1999).  
Table 2 shows the share of export price obtained by the producers five years before the reforms 
and five years after the reforms. Changes in this ratio illustrate the changes in the distribution of 
income between the producers and intermediaries. In six out of nine cases, there is a substantial 
increase in the share of export price going to the producers. It shows that the reforms were 
successful in their objectives of transferring income from the intermediaries to the producers. At 
the same time these changes can also be interpreted as having disturbed the previous income 
distribution and political equilibrium and this disturbance can be an important reason for lack of 
consensus. In three cases, Tanzania tea, Tanzania tobacco, and Zambia cotton, the producers‟ 
share of the export prices did not increase after the reforms. The reforms in these three cases did 
not change the rent distribution against then-existing processors and intermediaries. Yet these are 
the three cases where there was longer term sustained growth. In the other six cases where there 
was significant redistribution; five of them did not achieve sustained growth after the initial spurt. 
These are cashew in Tanzania and Mozambique, and coffee in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
 14 
While not perfect, these results suggest that redistribution played an important role in the 
sustainability of policy changes and growth accelerations. 
Finally, the arrangements for production, processing, marketing, and support require specific 
institutional structures. As pointed out before, these were organized around the parastatals which 
were being eliminated with the reforms. Somewhat different institutional arrangements emerged 
for different commodities and countries after the reforms. It is to these organizational structures 
that we now turn.  
 
                                                 
14 The sixth case of Kenya tea is a special case where the interests and the political base of the leadership and the 
smallholder tea producers coincided.  8 
 
Table 2: Changes in the Producers' Share of Export Price Following the Reforms 
Commodity  Country 
Period 
Producers’ Share 









Coffee  Kenya  1988-92  1993-97  51%  80% 
Coffee  Uganda  1988-92  1993-97  12%  39% 
Cashew  Mozambique  1990-94  1995-99  22%  39% 
Cashew  Tanzania  1988-92  1993-97  37%  54% 
Coffee  Tanzania  1990-94  1995-99  73%  94% 
Tea  Kenya  1988-92  1993-97  68%  85% 
Tea  Tanzania  1989-93  1994-98  28%  26% 
Cotton  Zambia  1990-94  1995-99  72%  60% 
Tobacco  Tanzania  1991-95  1996-00  35%  34% 
 
3.  Political Economy of Institutional Arrangements and Outcomes  
In almost all countries, the farming sector, especially the smallholders, need and receive 
significant price and non-price support. The non-price support, which includes research, inputs, 
extension, credit services and investments in supporting infrastructure, has to be taken into 
account in analyzing the output behavior of agricultural commodities. Furthermore, since a 
commodity is only one of the sectors among many, the amount of support it receives compared to 
other sectors is also important in determining its performance.
 15   
An important part of the support is the organizational arrangements and the quality of the 
institutions that supply this support. In SSA before these reforms this support was supplied 
through the parastatals.
 16 In general, these support systems have not been very effective in SSA 
                                                 
15Non-price supports can be classified under three main headings. First is the support through the development of 
new seeds, new disease mitigating activities, development of improved farming technologies, and other research 
related activities. Second are the investments in irrigation, drainage, transport, credit, marketplaces, etc to increase 
the productivity of farming and lower the cost of doing business for farmers. Third is the support through extension 
and similar programs that educate and help especially the smallholders to take advantage of the new research 
developments and farming systems. These are the activities that are implemented by the ministries of agriculture and 
constitute the core of the project support of international organizations such as the World Bank, FAO, IFAD, 
CGIAR, and others. It is possible to organize the non-price support to agriculture under different headings but the 
specific activities under these headings would be very similar.  
16 In some countries, new seeds, better ways of farm management, infrastructure support etc were supplied 
reasonably efficiently by the public sector such as coffee in Vietnam and cotton in India and China. Earlier work on 9 
 
(World Bank 2008) and most of the public agencies tasked to undertake this support had actually 
taxed the agricultural sectors through interventions in marketing and processing rather than 
providing farmers with better seeds, new technologies, better transport, and easier access to 
credit. At the time of the reforms, most of these agencies had gone bankrupt and were not 
effectively supporting the sector. Therefore, the reforms focused primarily on eliminating these 
often bankrupt marketing companies along with removing restrictions on trading and production 
of the crops and reducing export taxes. 
The agricultural policy reforms also intended to reform these public institutions to deliver better 
support to agricultural production, especially to the smallholders.
17 Yet these reforms did not 
create the type of institutions that could manage the conflicts that existed or could arise under 
lower international prices or other internal or external shocks. Furthermore, the institutions that 
existed, such as cooperative associations, ministries, and other agencies, were not designed to 
manage potential problems because both the legal arrangements and the relevant stakeholders had 
changed with the reforms. Thus, the reforms were mostly policy changes without significant 
institutional development.  
In the cases where the existing arrangements were more satisfactory, usually there was an 
established marketing agency that had been given some autonomy by the political leadership. In 
these cases, it was easier to move to a framework of greater autonomy and efficiency of 
delivering support. Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA) is one such example. In other 
cases, this efficiency and autonomy were assisted by the existence of strong multinational 
companies that protected these agencies and the smallholders associated with them. Tea and 
tobacco in Tanzania and cotton in Zambia show that large international companies can extend 
significant support to the commodities given their resources. Existence of specialized research 
institutes, dedicated programs on seeds, pesticides, credit, etc also help the farmers to overcome 
the shocks and have higher long run growth rates. Technological developments and their rapid 
dissemination such as Bt cotton in India and China which increased yields and outputs 
significantly are equally important. In such cases, there are discontinuities which have to be 
treated outside the normal paradigms.    
In other five cases, the old parastatals were either privatized in name or given so called 
autonomy. These agencies continued to behave in a way similar to what they had been doing 
before with some ad hoc improvements. Availability of special donor projects for these 
commodities sometimes created periods of increased support. In Mozambique INCAJU is still 
very much a public agency despite the fact that it was privatized long time ago and its support to 
the smallholders is considered to be quite weak. In Kenya and Tanzania, the coffee cooperatives 
continued to control marketing of coffee and were never really privatized and created an 
                                                                                                                                                              
agricultural service delivery had shown that even before the Doi Moi reforms, there was an efficient and extensive 
system of support for the agricultural households (Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik 2007).  
17 Sector investment programs complemented the agricultural reforms in many countries and tried to integrate the 
donor support around a common investment and institutional development program.         10 
 
inefficient system of supporting the smallholders. In Tanzania cashew, there was a series of 
changes where the cooperatives and local governments came into the marketing channels after the 
reforms time and again. In Uganda, UCDA which is a statutory public agency, never really 
operated as an efficient supplier of support. This does not mean that these agencies did not 
support the producers at all. For example, cashew spraying and seedlings were supported in both 
Mozambique and Tanzania. But these supports were not efficient, longer lasting, and effective to 
change the nature and the profitability of the commodity in question.    
A related question is why the parastatals were eliminated in some cases but stayed as quasi-
parastatals in others. Again, our hypothesis is that these outcomes are not independent of the 
original social and political consensus about the reforms and the degree of conflict about the 
reform program. As will be explained below, the evolution of the support systems are not 
accidental and are also determined by the strength of different groups of stakeholders, and their 
ability to transfer the resources to the different groups. The interaction of the political and social 
conflicts also gets reflected in the organizational support structures.   
In the nine Sub-Saharan African cases analyzed here, three different post-reform institutional 
arrangements have evolved. Of course, these are not the only institutional arrangements that are 
possible. However, these are the ones that have been identified in these specific cases. These 
organizational structures are related to the crop‟s role in political rent seeking and relative powers 
of different groups with a stake in the distribution of rents. First two groups, which we identify as 
more successful, are the ones where there was less initial political and social conflict on the 
reform program, the world price of the commodity in question are less volatile, and there was 
better non-price support.  
3.a. Direct Support by Large Multinationals  
In SSA, one outcome of the reforms was the replacement of the parastatals by large international 
companies that supplied inputs, extension, and created a ready market for the output, under quasi-
monopsonistic conditions. Cotton in Zambia and tobacco in Tanzania fit this description (Yagci 
and Aksoy 2011, Mitchell and Baregu 2011b). These monopsony powers were legally structured 
in Tanzania and were very effective while less formally structured and less effective in Zambia. 
In both cases, the export crops were not very significant in terms of their size and were not major 
sources of patronage to politically connected groups before the reforms. In both cases, parastatal 
companies were effectively and quickly privatized along with their processing facilities. The 
private multinational companies were allowed to find solutions to side-selling and the lack of 
contract enforcement -a basic problem with outgrower systems- without heavy-handed 
interventions by the state. In the terminology developed earlier, these cases could be classified as 
having less social and political conflict and a greater degree of political consensus on the reform 
program.   
In Zambia, the public sector cotton parastatal LINTCO, had a monopoly in cotton ginning and 
marketing and had been effectively bankrupt. LINTCO had not paid the farmers regularly for a 11 
 
long time, and last few years, even its staff was not being paid for many months. It was privatized 
at the end of 1994 and its ginneries were sold to two multinational companies. There was little 
controversy at its privatization and most of the staff was absorbed by the new companies. These 
companies started supplying credit, technical assistance, and seeds to the smallholders and bought 
the cotton and deducted the cost of the inputs from the sale proceeds. Output more than doubled 
after the reforms but declined rapidly after 1997-98 due to side-selling, credit defaults and the 
collapse of the original arrangements (see Figure 1). But even the collapsed level of output was 
much higher than it was before the reforms. By 2001 new arrangements were established and 
output started to increase and the output peak in 2005 was fourfold higher then pre-reform levels. 
The arrangements collapsed again in 2006 due to a price shock caused by the significant 
appreciation of the currency. Again new arrangements were established and output has started 
going up again. These output increases took place despite steadily declining real producer prices 
(Yagci and Aksoy 2011). 
   
 
Figure 1: Cotton Production and Producer Prices in Zambia 
 
In Tanzania private sector was allowed to market tobacco in 1995 and the processing company 
was privatized in 1997. There was a marked increase in output after the initial reform which 
continued until 1997 (Figure 2). When the parastatal company was privatized, two multinational 
companies entered the market and started giving credit and supplied inputs to the smallholders. In 
1998 there was a credit default by the farmers due to side-selling. The companies reduced their 
input supply and lowered prices paid to the farmers to compensate for the loan losses. This led to 
declines in output. A new arrangement was reached in after 2000 when a quasi-monopsonistic 
arrangement was instituted and output exploded helped by more satisfactory non-price support 



































































































































Figure 2: Tobacco Production and Producer Prices in Tanzania 
 
In these two cases the reforms were successful despite internal and external shocks and other 
structural breaks. The sectors were able to find ways to reestablish a new equilibrium and 
continue the growth process. Output in both cases increased substantially despite the fact that 
producer price did not increase significantly. Significant quality increases were also achieved in 
both cases due to better extension by the multinational companies. These companies, in both 
cases, were permitted by the state to experiment with alternative contractual arrangements for the 
provision of “support” while exercising their monopsony powers. Both experienced negative 
shocks and output collapses, once in the start of the privatization program in Tanzania due to 
side-selling, and twice in Zambia -once due to side-selling and once due to a price collapse 
caused by the appreciation of the currency.
18  
At the same time, there are differences between the two cases. First, the Tanzanian tobacco 
producers were able to establish a tobacco board from the beginning and were allowed to set up a 
company that was an effective monopsony. In Zambia, there were attempts to set up a cotton 
board but it never became effective and the firms were left to their own devices.  
Second, throughout the period of 1990-2008,   the volatility of cotton producer prices in Zambia 
was more than twice as high as the volatility of tobacco prices in Tanzania.  So the higher price 
volatility in Zambia cotton could have contributed to the two collapses. 
Third, significant productivity increase occurred in Tanzania tobacco after the reforms, while 
there was almost no productivity increase in Zambia cotton. While there might be alternative 
explanations for the difference -higher volatility, shocks in the middle of the reform period, etc- 
one possible explanation might be the selection of the farmers. In Zambia, the expansion was 
carried out essentially by increasing the number of farmers, thus area expansion. Most of the 
                                                 
18 Recent policy reversals in Tanzania and elimination of the longer-term contracts might create another collapse if 





































































































































farmers that were added on in the years of expansion were smaller producers that had much lower 
productivity. The addition of the lower productivity farmers kept the average productivity from 
increasing. In Tanzania, the farmers that produced tobacco have been larger ones because the 
establishment of curing barns requires more substantial farmer investment than the production of 
cotton. Thus, the entry of new and inexperienced farmers was much less in tobacco than in 
cotton. Significant investments by the larger farmers for curing barns etc signal more credible 
contractual and larger financial commitments. Therefore, vertical coordination along the supply 
chain can more easily be achieved with larger farmers than with smaller producers that have less 
investment in their commodity production.
19  
3.b. Protective Structure with International Estates 
The second group where the reforms were also successful consists of tea sectors in Tanzania and 
Kenya (Mitchell 2011).
20  They fall into a category where the large multinationals have 
successfully erected a support mechanism for the smallholders. The tea sector is somewhat 
different than the other commodities because the output has to be processed very quickly, and the 
multinational companies dominate the international market. Tea prices have been rather stable, 
and the arrangements for international marketing have also been dominated by the multinational 
tea companies.  
The tea sector in Kenya has always been very well managed and continued to be well managed 
after the privatization of the KTDA in 1992.
21 The KTDA has effectively supported this sector by 
supplying research, inputs and technical assistance and was not involved in the marketing of tea. 
Both estate and smallholder production has increased at similar levels. Despite declining producer 
prices, output has continued to increase, and quality has continued to improve (Figure 3).  
 
                                                 
19 The new YIELD program started by Dunavant in Zambia seems to recognize the differences between large and 
smaller farmers and tries to focus on the larger farmers which might have higher productivity and longer term 
commitment to the sector.  
20 For the Tanzania tea case we rely primarily on the work of Baffes (2005a and 2005b), Ochieng (2010), and Tyler 
(2007).  
21 In Kenya, both the coffee and tea sector reforms were undertaken under the Public Enterprise Reform Program 
supported by the World Bank. There were also investment programs for both tea and coffee. While the tea projects 
were highly successful, the coffee projects were not.   14 
 
 
Figure 3: Tea Production and Producer Prices in Kenya 
 
While Tanzania nationalized most export crop estates, tea was mostly excluded. Only two tea 
estates were nationalized because they were a part of a holding company that was nationalized. 
After the reforms in 1993, the two nationalized estates were privatized. In 2000 six of the tea 
factories owned by the tea authority were sold and the regulatory and development functions of 
the tea authority were separated. The sector has expanded and the support mechanisms developed 
jointly with the estates have been improved. The output has continued to increase despite declines 
in producer prices (Figure 4). 
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In these two cases the multinational tea companies were rather strong, in both local and 
international markets. In both cases support to production was available because estates provided 
a part of the output. Baffes (2005a, p.590) has argued that the tea sector has been different than 
the other sectors in Tanzania.  “First, the reforms of the tea sector started much earlier than 
Tanzania‟s other export crop sectors (e.g. coffee, cotton, cashews). Second, there was no apparent 
„supply-driven‟ assistance or push for reforms; by and large, reforms originated from within the 
country, accordingly characterized by a considerable degree of government and sector ownership. 
Third, the reforms have been largely successful, although much remains to be done. Finally, it has 
taken a considerable amount of time and resources for the reforms to be carried out.” In Tanzania, 
the nationalization of most enterprises spared the tea estates except the two companies which 
were part of nationalized holding companies.  
In Kenya, KTDA has always been successful and it is one of the very cases where privatization 
has converted it to a smallholder owned company (Tyler 2007, Ochieng 2010). Under President 
Kenyatta, predominantly coffee and some tea producers, which were predominantly Kikiyu from 
the Central Province, were allowed a great degree of institutional and associational autonomy 
supported by a friendly government.
22 They were the basis of the political support for the 
Political system under Kenyatta. In 1978, President Moi was selected and its support base was the 
Kalenjin group from the Rift Valley. The change in the presidency meant that the power base of 
President Kenyatta, which was the coffee and tea producing Kikiyu households, had to be 
disfranchised. This led to the total takeover and mismanagement of the coffee sector by the 
Government and its long term demise will be explained in the next section. In the case of tea, 
however, there were other developments. Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) and 
World Bank had outstanding loans to KDTA and had veto powers on some of the decisions 
(Ochieng 2010). Bu the most important was the expansion of tea production outside the Central 
Province and among Kalenjin groups in the Rift Valley. There were increased incentives 
provided to the production of tea by non-Kikiyu groups in sections of the Rift Valley province 
where it was not grown before (Lofchie 2004). Thus a new arrangement which supported the 
groups allied with the political leadership meant that policy changes did not reverse the quasi 
independence of KTDA which was fully privatized to the smallholders in 2000. Therefore, there 
were historical developments that helped the sector to maintain its quasi autonomous status and 
there was much less controversy and conflict on its reform.  
Thus the estates and smallholder support agencies in both countries were left to manage 
themselves.  They also created a protective structure around the smallholders through supplying 
them with inputs; know how; and purchasing their crops and paying them on time. The tea sector 
reforms were successful.   
                                                 
22In the case of coffee, the policies which supported the Kikiyu coffee producers were abandoned and reversed to 
bring in greater control by the state.  16 
 
3.c. Reforms with Quasi Reformed Parastatals  
In the third group of cases, there was an initial positive supply response after the agricultural 
policy reforms. But this supply response could not be maintained in the face of internal and 
external shocks. These are cashew in Mozambique and Tanzania, and coffee in Kenya, Uganda, 
and Tanzania (Mitchell and Baregu 2011a, Aksoy and Yagci 2011, Mitchell 2011, Baffes and 
Onal 2011). These are a rather narrow set of commodities and countries, but they are 
representative of many other cases in the SSA, where major liberalizations gave way to ad hoc 
support arrangements. In all these cases, the parastatals were privatized but continued to be tied to 
the state. In all these cases, the smallholder producers were not aligned to the interests of the 
political leadership, but the intermediaries were. In all five cases, reforms changed the 
distribution of income in favor of the producers. The quasi-parastatals and other intermediaries 
tried to reverse the changes in the distribution through regaining the control the production and 
marketing. The controversies associated with these conflicts led to lack of sustained support to 
the smallholders. In these cases the supply depended on the behavior of international prices and 
domestic exchange rates as well as the ad hoc supports supplied by these quasi-parastatals or 
donors. In these five cases, reforms led to immediate output increases, but negative price shocks 
along with continuing conflict led to anemic long-run growth.  
 
 
Figure 5: Coffee Production and Producer Prices in Kenya 
 
Coffee was one of the key export sectors in Kenya throughout the 1970s and 1980s. New 
governments decided to reduce the incomes and political power of the coffee producers. Reforms 
to reduce the control of the cooperatives, allow private sector millers, and let the producers to 
conduct trades in foreign exchange were implemented in 1992. This led to a pickup in production 
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on cooperatives were lifted and the inefficient cooperatives were allowed to operate without any 
controls. They were also staffed by people not associated with the producers (Mude 2006, 
Nyangito 2001, Mitchell 2011). These developments and declining producer prices led to a major 
decline in production (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 6: Coffee Production and Producer Prices in Tanzania 
 
Performance of the coffee sector in Tanzania also illustrates a case where the supply response to 
the reforms was weak and output basically followed the trend in producer prices (Figure 6). This 
despite the fact that many coffee estates have been privatized and outputs in these estates have 
increased. In 2003, a direct marketing channel was opened for specialty coffee producers. This 
change along with increasing producer prices led to some increases in output. Despite these 
recent positive developments, output at the end of the period is about the same level as they were 
just after the reforms (Baffes 2005b, Mahdi 2010, Lofchie 2004). 
  
 










































































































































































































































































The Uganda coffee sector illustrates the positive effects of the reforms which could not be 
maintained and improved. Reforms coupled with increasing international prices have led to an 
almost doubling of output in a few years (Figure 8). Producer prices both due to the increasing 
share of export price paid to the farmers, devaluation, and the increase in international prices. 
Collapse of international prices, inability to deal effectively with the wilt disease, and a very 
unsuccessful replanting program led to the gradual collapse of output. By 2005, coffee output had 
declined to its level before the reforms. Producer price increases since then have led to an 
increase in output but by 2008, it had not reached its level of late 1990s (Baffes and Onal 2011).  
 
 
Figure 8: Cashew Production and Producer Prices in Mozambique 
 
 
Figure 9: Cashew Production and Producer Prices in Tanzania 
 
Cashew reforms in Mozambique have been one of the most contentious and highly publicized 
reforms in SSA. Export restrictions on raw cashew were eliminated in 1994 and there was a 
rebound in marketed output despite high export taxes. This continued until 2000 when 
international prices collapsed along with the output. There was a gradual improvement in the 














































































































































































































































































with spraying for diseases, and a replanting program. Despite these more positive developments, 
officially marketed output only reached its post reform peak in 2008 (Figure 9). 
Tanzanian cashew reforms started in 1992 when marketing was liberalized and private sector 
participation in marketing was allowed. Within few years, private sector developed input and 
marketing channels and there was also a shift from selling processed nuts to raw nut exports. 
After 1999, local governments slowly started to increase the taxes on cashew output, which 
reached as high as 60 percent of the value of output. There were partial attempts to reverse these 
policies, but they were all short lived and the local authorities managed to affect the payments to 
the smallholders either directly through taxation or through cooperatives and primary societies. 
Cashew Board of Tanzania managed to affect the pricing and marketing decisions throughout this 
period.  While the output has started to increase during the last few years, it is much lower than 
its peak level achieved during the early 2000s and much lower than the levels obtained in the 
early 1980s. In 2007, the new warehouse receipts system brought the cooperative back directly 
into the marketing system which does not bode well for the future (Mitchell and Baregu 2011a).  
In all these cases, there are a series of common themes. Initially, the distributive system was very 
much against the producers, and the reforms increased the producers‟ share of the world/export 
prices. The reforms effectively redistributed income from the processors (intermediaries) to 
farmers, leading to higher producer prices and increases in production in the immediate post-
reform period. In almost all cases, there were also conflicts and disagreements on the nature of 
the reform program. Arrangements for arbitration and mechanisms to monitor the emerging 
problems of the sector were absent.  These five cases (cashew in Tanzania and Mozambique, 
coffee in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda) fit into the structure of the developments outlined in the 
earlier sections of the paper where the reforms removed the immediate binding constraints on 
production and thus there was a supply response but did not create institutions that could sustain 
the changes.  
There were no support mechanisms built into the reform programs or developed after the reforms. 
There were ad hoc attempts to support the smallholders but none of them were systemic 
institutional changes.  
In cashew reforms in Tanzania and Mozambique, there were powerful groups that had large 
losses and thus a consensus on the reforms could not be achieved. In Tanzania these groups 
included the local governments and cooperative unions, while in Mozambique the losing group 
was private processors closely tied to the ruling party. Success of the coffee reforms in Kenya 
depended on the outcomes of a tribal struggle. Coffee growers supported the earlier regime and 
were penalized for it by the new government (Lofchie 2004). The reforms were never successful. 
Thus, the degree of political conflict for coffee reforms was quite high, which could have 
amplified the impact of external shocks. In Tanzania coffee, the cooperatives effectively blocked 
reforms and continued to extract rents through local taxes or controlling the marketing systems 
(Baffes 2005b, Mahdi 2008). Even a decade after the reforms, most of the policy changes are still 
controversial and there is still no consensus on their desirability. 20 
 
Reforms increased the share of the world/export price going to the farmers. Farmers responded if 
this increase in their shares also corresponded to an increase in the real producer prices. If those 
were also favorable, that is not decreasing substantially; output expanded. The supply response 
continued until an international price collapse or an intervention by the state occurred to reverse 
the price increases for the producers. Due to a lack of systemic support arrangements, output in 
this group of five countries has been much more sensitive to real producer price developments 
than the other two groups where support could maintain the supply response despite unfavorable 
prices.  
The current outputs in these cases are often at their levels which were obtained just after the 
reforms.  It is the prices that drives the output, but within limits of what has been obtained before. 
Output increases have occurred in recent years primarily because of increases in international 
prices. In these cases, we do not observe structural changes leading to much higher output levels 
like the two other more successful groups.  
4.  Conclusions  
In this paper we have sought to develop a framework to help explain the outcomes of agricultural 
sector reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa using a set of nine case studies as examples. The 
framework is inspired by the work of Rodrik that postulates that sustained GDP growth is a 
function of the degree of consensus that exists in a society and ability and strength of institutions 
to manage distributional conflicts. Shocks, especially price shocks, whatever their cause, can 
trigger conflicts because they redistribute incomes from one group to another. The greater the 
consensus around an initial set of policy reforms, the higher the likelihood that groups found and 
developed new arrangements to solve such conflicts and continue growing. Where such an initial 
consensus is lacking shocks are more likely to result in policy reversals. It is not the design of the 
initial reform that guarantees success, but the ability of the stakeholders to redistribute incomes 
(accept redistribution) when an unexpected development takes place. We argue that this is 
determined to a large degree by the level of consensus that existed on the initial reforms. 
Reforms are multi-stage processes. The focus of the agricultural policy reforms in SSA was 
predominantly on the “first stage” in which regulatory and fiscal constraints on the private sector 
were reduced or eliminated. Following such first stage reforms production increased in seven of 
the nine cases analyzed here, and the reforms appeared to be successful. This initial positive 
response often led the governments and the donors to complacency and delayed actions to 
respond to potential problems. In some cases where farmers received a higher share of export 
prices and increased their output, these output gains were not sustained. We attribute this to the 
significant redistribution from the elites to the farmers, which led the former to try to reverse the 
reforms and destroy the new arrangements.  In many cases the crises were also triggered by a 
negative price shock that lowered producer prices and exacerbated the conflict among different 
stakeholders on how to redistribute the reduced returns. The absence of significant non-price 21 
 
support in many cases amplified the effects of these shocks and delayed the supply response 
when prices improved.  
On the other hand, there are cases where the reform programs were successful despite internal 
and external shocks. In these cases, the sector was able to reorganize itself, find ways of meeting 
the new challenges and reach a new equilibrium which led to sustaining growth in output. 
Examples included the redesign and extension of smallholder support mechanisms and better 
non-price support programs. Support institutions in these cases were given greater autonomy and 
were more efficient – responses to shocks were quick and positive.  
Our main hypothesis is that the key variable that explains the capacity to respond to external and 
internal shocks is the degree of political and social consensus on the reforms. In the cases where 
the first-stage positive supply response could not be maintained, the degree of political and social 
consensus on the reforms was also weak from the beginning. In addition, the mechanisms to 
redistribute income after a negative shock were not built into the new institutional arrangements. 
Old groups which received rents from the activity either maintained their shares or came back in 
after the reforms to reestablish their shares. The conflicts also led to an under supply of services 
to smallholders, which led to fights over a smaller output. The cases discussed in this paper also 
show that without generating an acceptable outcome among the stakeholders, attempts to develop 
effective and efficient support systems can easily fail as they may be corrupted and used to 
reestablish pre-reform distributional outcomes. 
In the cases where the reforms were successful, there was greater consensus on the reform 
program. The rent seeking fight was not intense and usually producers were one of the 
stakeholders supported by the governments. Although difficult to prove conclusively, the 
existence of more autonomous and efficient non-price support agencies could also be related to 
the lack of conflict around these commodities. From our limited cases, one important new 
development seems to be the entry of international companies and their operation through new 
legal arrangements supported by international donors. This model seems to work better if the 
product is small vis-à-vis the rest of the economy and is not important historically as a key sector 
in rent allocation. The successful cases also suggest that non-price support is as important as the 
pricing of the commodity. But low shares given to the farmers under these arrangements leave 
them open to predation by other private sector entrants or by previous stakeholders such as 
cooperatives and other agencies. Finally, in most of the successful cases, there was enough 
political and economic space for the stakeholders to find alternatives to the existing arrangements 
in the face of external and internal shocks.  
The literature argues that in low income countries with less developed institutional systems, 
positive outcomes depend on the agreements among the elites that determine the allocation of 
benefits among the groups they support (Levy 2011, Levy and Spiller 1996). In all our cases, 
there were established arrangements before the reforms where the parastatals were used to 
allocate the rents among different groups. In some, it was the cooperatives and local 
governments, in others politicians and the public sector employees were involved in the 22 
 
distribution. When these systems collapsed in late 1980s, conflicts came to the fore and new 
groups emerged that had a say in the outcomes. 
There is sufficient diversity in the outcomes across similar products and countries to suggest it is 
possible to have local level outcomes that are different from national ones. There can be local 
successes as well as failures. The cases discussed in this paper suggest that rather than trying to 
model the political economy structures within countries, more emphasis should be placed on sub-
national and sectoral arrangements and outcomes (Levy 2011). Without well-developed 
institutional support structures, and explicit agreements between all stakeholders, it is difficult to 
generate sustained growth episodes even in micro and local environments. Formal or informal 
mechanisms that bring the stakeholders together and allow the parties to develop alternatives to 
shocks and unforeseen developments seem to be the only reasonable strategy.  
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